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Abstract 
In order to show that a CO2 offshore storage site is secure, it must be effectively characterized and a full 
understanding of any risks, and their management, must be in place. The Goldeneye candidate CO2 storage site, 
centred on a depleted gas field, is used as a worked example. Two techniques for assessing the suitability and 
containment risks of a potential storage site were employed.  A methodology based on Evidence Support Logic 
(ESL), as implemented in the TESLA software, is used to assess the suitability of the site, while the specific 
containment risk is assessed using the Bow-tie risk assessment methodology.  
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1. Introduction 
Hydrocarbon extraction requires the removal of fluids or gasses from the subsurface – at times water 
or gas are injected to maintain pressure or improve the sweep – but the process generally reduces 
pressures, removes the product, and finally ends up at a stable minimum. 
Geological storage of CO2 requires the injection of CO2 into the subsurface – this increases both the 
fluid pressures and volume of product in the subsurface. The injected CO2 therefore has potential to 
migrate over a period of time and can be thought of as a disturbed system. 
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The challenge for CO2 storage projects is to show that we understand this new disturbed system. We 
have to demonstrate that we are confident of containment – and we have developed a way to do this via a 
structured risk assessment. 
In evaluating the suitability of the Goldeneye candidate store, Shell used two techniques for the 
containment risks. The Evidence Supported Logic (ESL) methodology, implemented using the TESLA 
software tool, was used to assess the suitability of the site, while the site specific containment risk was 
assessed using the Bow-tie risk assessment methodology.  
This paper examines the process followed to determine the suitability of the Goldeneye candidate CO2 
store. 
2. Background to the Goldeneye candidate CO2 store 
After significant work spanning a number of years, it can be argued that the Goldeneye candidate 
storage complex in the Central North Sea is the most mature in the UK. The site has the additional 
advantage of demonstrating the re-use of existing oil and gas infrastructure. This existing infrastructure 
also paves the way for cost-effective future appraisal and expansion into massive saline aquifer systems 
that are either laterally connected to the Goldeneye field or that overlie the field. 
The store has been selected by a Shell CCS (Carbon Capture and Storage) project that is being actively 
progressed for a post combustion gas-fired power station project. The depleted offshore field was 
identified as an ideal CO2 store:  
 It recently came to the end of its production life.  
 The facilities are young, having been installed in 2004, and are normally unmanned.  
 The platform is tied back to shore with a dedicated pipeline.  
 Geologically the formation is of excellent Darcy quality sandstone, and is well connected – even tank 
like.  
 Evidence supporting containment is excellent:  
 The field has held gas (with a percentage of CO2) for an estimated 55 million years and there is no 
evidence of escape features.  
 The field is topped, at approximately 2500m depth, by a competent caprock, then chalk formations, 
then secondary storage formations (sequestration targets in their own right), additional caprocks and 
finally a sequence of sands, shales and muds.  
 There are very few well penetrations – that could provide man-made leak paths – and the current 
production wells can be converted into injectors.  
 Finally monitoring the field in 120m of water is feasible and so are corrective measures on wells 
should they be necessary. 
 
The geological details of the storage complex and site are discussed in the companion paper, 
Development of an offshore monitoring plan for a commercial CO2 storage pilot [1], also presented at this 
conference and will not be repeated here.  
3. Risk assessment techniques 
There are many different methods of assessing risk, however, they may be divided into Quantitative 
and Qualitative groups. To perform a robust quantitative risk assessment, historical performance data are 
required to provide empirical evidence for the occurrence frequency of rare events. Although CO2 has 
been used in miscible gas flooding for decades, and underground hydrocarbon gas storage is a proven 
technology, underground storage of CO2 is new and currently lacks the body of empirical evidence 
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required. This means that it is not possible to perform a rigorous quantitative risk assessment. 
Instead, Shell employs two techniques for assessing the suitability and containment risks of a potential 
storage site. The suitability of a storage site is assessed using a structured evidence-based screening and 
assessment tool based on Evidence Support Logic (ESL) as implemented in the TESLA software. The 
containment risk assessment employs the bow-tie risk assessment technique which is widely used in the 
assessment of facilities risks and is an integral part of the process used to demonstrate that risks are As 
Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP). 
4. TESLA assessment  
It is key to ensure that all risks in a sequestration project have been identified and subsequently 
addressed. One technique regularly used in waste disposal is to compare the project against a Features, 
Events and Processes (FEP) database (Savage et al. [2]). Comparing the project parameters against 
standard FEP databases for CO2 storage reduces the likelihood that the project ‘misses‘ something 
material.  
When large volumes of information are combined from multiple sources there might be disputed or 
contradictory interpretations. Some evidence might be from hard quantitative data, while other evidence 
might arise from analogue reasoning or expert judgment. Therefore, in order to provide a justified 
interpretation of the available evidence it is necessary to make visible judgments on both the quality of 
the data and their interpretation.  
The technique of Evidence Supported Logic (ESL) involves systematically breaking down the question 
under consideration into a logical hypothesis model whose elements expose basic judgements and 
technical opinions relating to the quality of evidence relating to a particular interpretation or proposition 
[3].  
Shell has taken the Quintessa FEP database [4] and experience from CCS, EOR (Enhanced Oil 
Recovery) and Gas storage projects and worked with Quintessa † to apply ESL to CO2 storage. The 
resulting tool is implemented in software called  TESLA – The Evidence Support Logic Application. The 
ESL based tool can be viewed as an overarching storage project risk assessment and health check. It helps 
to ensure that all risks have been covered, and it highlights where a project’s weaknesses lie by tabulating 
the evidence supporting the main hypotheses, the evidence against the hypotheses and the uncertainty 
(current level of unknowns). The TESLA software allows users to embed within it explanations of the 
judgments made and the supporting evidence base (e.g. reports, web links), thereby building an audit trail.  
Repeated application through time by the same team allows monitoring of how the project is progressing 
in reducing the risk and uncertainty.  
A cornerstone of ESL is three-value logic. Judgments of hypotheses based on classical probability 
theory follow two-value logic where evidence for or against the hypothesis is either true or false. This 
assumes perfect knowledge about the system. Three-value logic adds a third element (Fig. 1) – 
uncertainty due to unknowns or uncertainty due to "overcommitted belief", whereby the evidence for and 
against a hypothesis, when judged independently, implies probabilities of truth and falsehood that sum to 
a value different from 1. 
 
 
† Experts in assessing the risks associated with varied underground activities, including CO2 storage, natural gas storage, cavern 
stabilization and nuclear waste management 
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Fig 1: Classical Boolean logic compared to three-value logic 
The TESLA analysis presents the assessment of CO2 sequestration in a logical tree-based structure 
with the top hypothesis supported by the key sub-hypotheses of CCS (Fig. 2 and Fig.3), which in turn are 
broken down into further sub-hypotheses component parts.  
 
Fig 2: Decision tree developed in TESLA for the project, showing top-level hypotheses. Red and green numbers to the left of the 
hypotheses are weighting factors that control propagation of confidence for (green bars) and against (red bars) hypotheses. 
The next key element to the TESLA analysis is that the hypothesis results (the evidence for, against 
and the remaining uncertainty) for each node are rolled up to give a top level assessment of evidence for 
the whole project. Two weighting factors are used, one for supporting evidence the other for refuting. 
These factors are, by their nature, subjective however, what is key is to maintain the same factors for all 
the assessments in a project. Note (see Fig. 2) that the evidence against has stronger weighting factors 
than the supporting evidence – the system is tuned for high certainty or to emphasise negative evidence. 
While this top level assessment is qualitative, when the ESL exercise is applied repeatedly and 
consistently during a project it provides a valuable tracking device to show if the risk and uncertainty 
levels in a project are decreasing as a result of the project work. It can also be applied to multiple 
sequestration candidates within a portfolio to establish relative maturity and security.  
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Fig 3: Expanded containment hypothesis showing subordinate hypotheses. 
One of the analysis tools that TESLA provides is a ratio or kite plot, which provides a measure of the 
ratio of evidence for to evidence against on the y-axis and residual uncertainty on the x-axis (Fig.  4.) On 
such a plot, during a project’s evolution the top level node should, we hope, move upwards and towards 
the vertical axis – as evidence for the hypothesis increases and the uncertainty decreases. A site that does 
not screen will move downwards and towards the axis. 
 
 
Fig 4: TESLA ratio plot. 1 indicates the top level node – the rolled up result for the tree. The other boxes are end nodes. + indicates 
that there is more than one node under the box.  
From a project management perspective the ratio plot is especially useful as it highlights areas of 
uncertainty or risk and thereby, areas that need more work. More detail can be found in [3]. 
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5. Bow-tie risk assessment  
The benefits of using bow-tie analysis for risk management have been realised by organisations world-
wide across a variety of business sectors and the method has been in widespread use since the mid-1990s. 
It provides a readily understandable representation of the relationships between the causes of unwanted 
events, the escalation of such events to a range of possible outcomes, the controls preventing the event 
from occurring and the mitigation measures in place to limit the consequences. It is regularly used in 
facilities engineering.  
Illustrating the preventive and mitigation controls against their respective causes and consequences in 
such a structured way demonstrates that risks are understood and are being controlled, and can highlight 
gaps in risk control which should be a focus for remedial action. The bow-tie diagram provides a simple 
visual demonstration of the way in which risks are managed. This allows understanding at all levels, 
including non-risk specialists, giving everyone the opportunity to review the existing controls in place and 
to identify any potential improvements.  
 
Fig 5: Bow-tie diagram schematic 
The bow-tie method entails building a bow-tie diagram (Fig. 5), step-by-step, to produce a qualitative 
risk assessment of the hazard under consideration.  
For the Goldeneye CCS project, the hazard is CO2. It has the potential to cause harm (e.g. by its 
toxicity to people who are engulfed by a cloud of CO2, by acidic corrosion or pH modification when CO2 
is dissolved in water or by contributing to greenhouse gas induced environmental damage).  
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Hazards normally do not cause harm because they are kept under control. However, if control of the 
hazard is lost, an initial incident will occur – this is the top event and is shown at the centre of the bow-tie 
diagram. For the Goldeneye CCS project, the top event is movement of CO2 outside the confines of the 
storage complex.  
The causes (sometimes called ‘threats‘) illustrate the various ways in which the hazard could be 
released i.e. what could cause loss of control of the hazard? Examples of causes which could result in 
movement of CO2 outside the Goldeneye storage complex include, but are not limited to,  leakage 
through existing faults or fractures which cross the primary and secondary seal, injection induced stress 
causing new faults or fractures or re-opening existing faults or fractures, and flow of CO2 up through 
abandoned wellbores.  
Once control is lost and the top event occurs, there may be a number of ways in which the event can 
develop to the ultimate consequence. Each consequence will result in a specific extent of harm i.e. 
severity of impact. The impact might be on people, the environment, physical assets or the reputation of 
the company, or all of these. Examples of potential consequences relevant to the Goldeneye project are 
the release of CO2 at the seabed or platform; a release into the shallow subsurface, or a deeper release just 
above the storage complex seal. 
There are barriers in place which can prevent the release of the hazard (i.e. prevent the threat leading to 
the top event). These barriers are shown on the left side of the bow-tie diagram and can be items of 
equipment or actions taken in accordance with training and procedures. They also include natural barriers 
such as impermeable geological layers. No control can be 100% effective, so if the preventive measures 
fail to maintain control and the top event occurs, further mitigation measures are in place to interrupt 
development of the event and limit, or recover from, the consequences.  
Circumstances may arise which undermine a preventive or mitigative control and reduce its 
effectiveness; these are recorded on the diagram as escalation factors (i.e. they allow the event to 
escalate). Escalation factors are, in turn, managed by further control measures.  
During bow-tie analysis, the effectiveness of each control is assessed and recorded. Some types of 
control are more effective than others. For example, eliminating the hazard altogether or substituting it for 
a less hazardous one is the most effective type of control. Obviously eliminating or substituting the CO2 
in this CCS project is not an option.  
The bow-tie analysis does not stop once the currently planned controls have been recorded; the 
following questions are also asked:  
 “Do we comply with company and industry standards?” ;  
 “Can we improve the effectiveness of the existing controls?”;  
 “Are there any more controls that can be implemented?”; and  
 “Is it reasonably practicable so to do?”.  
The analysis therefore identifies additional controls, over and above those currently planned, which 
can reduce the risk still further. These new risk reduction measures are recorded during the bow-tie 
analysis and actions are raised to evaluate whether or not they should be implemented. In this way, the 
bow-tie analysis can be used to demonstrate that the risks are reduced to levels which are As Low As 
Reasonably Practicable (ALARP). ALARP risk is reached when the effort involved in implementing any 
new risk reduction measures is grossly disproportionate to the benefit (i.e. risk reduction) gained. 
Shell’s three main operated CO2 storage projects to date have all employed bow-tie containment risk 
assessments. For the Goldeneye CCS project the bow-tie analysis was conducted during a series of multi-
disciplinary workshops over a period of several months, facilitated by an independent bow-tie 
practitioner. 
The identified threats and consequences analysed using the bow-tie method for Goldeneye are shown 
in Figures 6 and 7. The likelihood of each threat was evaluated by the analysis team. The likelihood 
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criteria are: 
A: Never heard of in the industry 
B: Heard of in the (hydrocarbon) industry 
C: Has happened in the organisation or more than once per year in the industry 
D: Has happened at the location or more than once per year in the organisation 
E: Has happened more than once per year at the location 
 
 
 
Fig 6: Schematic representation of the Goldeneye containment bow-tie risk assessment showing A: threats, B: evaluation showing 
that the risk of having a top level event is low, and C: potential leak scenarios that could take place were natural and engineered 
barriers to fail . 
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Fig 7: Top level bow-tie for Goldeneye. The right hand side shows the potential consequences of a top level event. It is worth noting 
that these consequences are shared by all offshore CCS projects. 
A birds-eye view of the full bow-tie developed is shown in Fig. 8 to give an impression of the overall 
analysis and the number of barriers identified. 
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Fig 8: Birds-eye view of the full Goldeneye bow-tie (excluding escalation factors and controls on these for size reasons) 
The threats in the bow-tie are listed in Table 1, and are cross referenced to each CCS stage.  A detailed 
analysis underlies the evaluation of each barrier in the system. For fully effective barriers, the control is 
continuously in place, functions properly when tested, and requires only infrequent repair.  For controls 
relying on the actions of people, the individuals are deemed competent and their training is up to date. It 
is this analysis that forms the majority of the work involved in proving a CO2 store.  
Table 1 Summary of threats to CO2 containment 
Threats Relevant CCS Stage 
Acid fluids  
Acid fluids perforate primary seal (Rødby) Post-closure at hydrostatic 
Acid fluids react with minerals in existing fault / fracture cement making 
them conductive / open 
Injection, post-closure below hydrostatic and post-
closure at hydrostatic 
Acid fluids react with minerals in the reservoir weakening the formation 
and causing failure (geomechanical failure). 
Injection, post-closure below hydrostatic and post-
closure at hydrostatic 
Acid fluids react with minerals in the fault / fracture cement allowing fault 
to reactivate (reactive transport) 
Injection, post-closure below hydrostatic and post-
closure at hydrostatic 
Diffusion  
Pure diffusion of CO2 through primary seal (Rødby)  Injection, post-closure below hydrostatic and post-
closure at hydrostatic 
Stress of injection  
Stress of injection / refilling causes fault opening or formation of new open 
fault in seal 
Injection 
Stress of injection / refilling causes tensile / shear fracture opening or 
formation of new open fractures in primary seal / cap rock 
Injection 
Faults, fractures and features  
Existing faults, mapped / unmapped crossing primary seal (not secondary Injection (local effects) and post-closure at 
4814   Owain Tucker et al. /  Energy Procedia  37 ( 2013 )  4804 – 4817 
Threats Relevant CCS Stage 
seal) create leak path hydrostatic 
Existing faults / features that cross primary and secondary seal Injection and post-closure at hydrostatic 
Lateral migration  
Lateral migration beyond the storage complex. Injection 
Abandoned wells  
Flow up abandoned exploration and appraisal wellbores to near surface Injection, post-closure below hydrostatic and 
(particularly) post-closure at hydrostatic 
Abandoned injection wells create leak path Post-closure below hydrostatic and (particularly) 
post-closure at hydrostatic 
Injection wells  
Injection well tubing leak to annuli Injection 
Behind production casing cross flow Injection, post-closure below hydrostatic and post-
closure at hydrostatic 
In order to better understand the relative risks and to prioritise areas for further investigation the 
likelihood of each threat and the severity of each consequence was assessed using the Shell risk 
assessment matrix (RAM). 
5.1. Potential further risk reduction (preventive) 
During analysis of each threat branch, the technical team considered whether any further risk reduction 
measures could possibly be adopted, over and above those already planned.  A total of 20 risk reduction 
measures were identified across all threat branches, with some occurring on more than one branch 
resulting in 13 unique risk reduction measures.   
The potential benefits of each risk reduction measure were assessed by the team, together with a 
qualitative assessment of the effort (e.g. cost, practical difficulties) involved in implementing the 
measure.  A decision was then made to either: 
 retain the risk reduction measure and consider it further and/or subject it to further analysis during the 
detailed design stage of the project (8 measures); 
 reject the measure at this point in time, but reserve the option to re-consider the measure if a 
catastrophic problem was encountered (i.e. as part of the intervention / mitigation plan) (3 measures); 
or 
 reject the measure given its cost, environmental impact and practical difficulties (2 measures). 
The most commonly occurring risk reduction measures were: 
 Sidetrack or drill new injection wells (instead of converting current producing wells to injection 
wells).  The advantages of this are that a completely new injection well design can be adopted and, if 
the existing wells are given over to monitoring, additional monitoring points are provided.  However, 
this option would entail extremely high cost / effort. It also introduces additional potential leak paths 
from the storage complex.   
 Side track or recomplete existing wells deeper.  This would increase the distance of the injection 
points from the cap rock (so reducing thermal cooling effects on the cap rock) and would allow more 
efficient refilling of the reservoir.  Again this measure entails extremely high cost / effort, and also 
makes injection more difficult (due to relative permeability effects). 
Given these advantages and disadvantages, the technical team decided that neither of these two 
measures should be adopted at present, but they should be retained as part of the potential intervention / 
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mitigation plan. 
 
5.2. Consequences 
Consequences have the potential to take place if all barriers and mitigative actions should fail. This 
should never happen, but as in all human activity, it is important to understand what could happen should 
all barriers and mitigative actions fail. On the right hand side of the bow-tie diagram in Fig. 7, eight 
consequences were identified. 
Consequences in CCS are all variations on the potential for a release of CO2 from the storage complex. 
Not all releases get to surface, and even if a release were to reach the surface the volumes and rates are 
such that it is unlikely to cause harm to people or the environment. Onshore this is evidenced by 
photographs of people standing next to Chrystal Geyser, Utah [5], and as reported by Roberts [6] in her 
study of the health risks of natural CO2 seeps in Italy. In an offshore environment many of consequences 
for people are further mitigated by the sea water. Consequences are therefore assessed according to their 
effects on people, assets, the environment and the reputation of the company and industry.  
The vast majority of the consequences were assessed to have either low or very low risk of any effect 
on people, infrastructure or the environment.  A large release at the seabed with a short duration was 
judged to pose only low or very low likelihood of any effect to people and the environment.  The highest 
threat to people would be if well control was lost and CO2 was to flow up the well to the surface and there 
were people on the platform at the time. All consequences have mitigation measures in place to stop them 
talking place. These are detailed in the corrective measures plan that is required as part of the EU 
directive.  
 
5.3. ALARP Demonstration  
The risk management framework described in Guidance Document 1 [8] on the implementation of 
CCS Directive [9] requires that: “for every risk identified, with its associated uncertainty, the aim is to 
reduce both the risk and uncertainty to acceptable levels” 
The guidance goes on to explain that: “In practice this is a matter of identifying the options for 
reducing the risk and uncertainty, their costs and their consequences for risk and uncertainty reduction”. 
While there is no explicit requirement in the framework to demonstrate that the risk has been reduced 
to As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) levels, the spirit of the directive, as described in the 
guidance, aligns with the recognised approach of demonstrating ALARP and the bow-tie analysis was 
used to provide a documented ALARP demonstration for the Goldeneye CCS project. 
ALARP is defined as the point where, when objectively assessed, the time, cost and difficulty of 
further risk reduction measures becomes grossly disproportionate to the risk reduction achieved.   
A risk cannot be demonstrated as ALARP until consideration has been given to 
1. means of further reducing the risk; and 
2. reasons why these further means have not been adopted. 
5.3.1. Achieving ALARP risk levels 
The first step in the process is to ensure that the facility meets certain standards. 
Once such minimum standards are met, there is still a requirement to demonstrate that the remaining 
risks are reduced to ALARP levels.  This is achieved by identifying measures which, if implemented, 
could bring about a reduction in risk levels.  The added benefit of each risk reduction measure is assessed 
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to determine the benefit gained and the effort (whether in money, time or practical difficulty) involved in 
implementing the measure.   
The process is not one of balancing the costs and benefits of measures but, rather, of adopting 
measures except where they are ruled out because they involve grossly disproportionate effort.  ALARP 
has been achieved when the resources required for the implementation of additional measures which may 
further reduce risk are unreasonably large when compared to the potential benefit to be gained.  
Resources would be better applied to reduce risk in another area.   
Once all risk reduction measures have been considered and the justification for acceptance or rejection 
on the grounds of gross disproportion documented, it has been demonstrated that risks have been reduced 
to the lowest level that is reasonably practicable. 
By examining and challenging the design (i.e. by asking “can we make the controls more effective?” 
and “is there anything more we can do?”), it is possible to make the conjecture that the risk of CO2 release 
from the storage complex is reduced to ALARP levels. This can then be checked and validated by the 
regulatory authorities prior to storage permit award.  
6. Conclusions 
The early stages of evaluation of a CO2 store are ideally suited to the ESL methodology as implemented 
in TESLA. This facilitates the comparison of different storage sites, and the tracking of the progress of a 
single storage site during the technical assessment. By using three-value logic the ESL methodology 
explicitly acknowledges and exposes the uncertainty inherent in any geoscience based analysis and is 
therefore a significant improvement on Boolean logic based approaches.  
Once the site assessment is mature it is necessary to perform a more structured analysis to show 
evidence of containment, and to highlight areas where risks must be managed through engineered 
solutions (such as monitoring and remediation). This task is performed using a structured bow-tie risk 
assessment approach. The result of this is an explicit assessment, which is open to challenge by regulatory 
authorities and stakeholders, of whether the risks to loss of containment have been reduced to as low as 
reasonably practicable (ALARP). 
The Goldeneye candidate storage site in the UK has used both of these techniques and, in our opinion, 
has shown that the risk of containment breach has been reduced to ALARP. 
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